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VIRGINIA'S REACTION TO AN IMPLIED WARRANTY IN REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: BRUCE FARMS, INC. V. COUPE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Years ago, caveat emptor' was the rule in real estate transactions. A
home buyer's own inspection was considered reliable in determining if the
house was structurally sound and habitable. 2 Today, the situation is different. Potentially troublesome conditions in a house are easily concealed,
and inspection by the buyer may not reveal latent defects.3 For this reason,
the doctrine of implied warranty has replaced caveat emptor in many
jurisdictions.'
Recently, in Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe,' the Virginia Supreme Court
refused to apply the doctrine of implied warranty to real estate transactions. This comment traces the decline of the caveat emptor doctrine and
examines the Bruce Farms decision in light of the overwhelming trend
towards replacing caveat emptor with an implied warranty in realty sales.
II.

DEVELOPMENTS OF IMPLIED WARRANTY IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

The doctrine of caveat emptor was once the dominant rule in sales of
both personal and real property.' Caveat emptor was a creation of the
judiciary "during the sixteenth century in the then chancy conditions of
English trade operations." 8 Subsequently, the doctrine became embedded
1. "Let the buyer beware (or take care)." BLAcK'S LAW DicrONARY 281 (Rev. 4th.ed. 1968).
2. Comment, 29 MERcER L. Rv.323 (1977).
3. "The ordinary home buyer is not in a position, by skill or training, to discover defects
lurking in the plumbing, the electrical wiring, the structure itself, all of which is usually
covered up and not open for inspection." Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Wyo.
1975).
4. Implied warranty has been defined differently in different states. See, e.g., Carpenter
v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964)(workmanlike manner of construction); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966)(habitability); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1,
280 N.E.2d 300 (1972) (fitness for habitation); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App.
1969)(workmanlike manner of construction); House v. Thorton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d
199 (1969)(fitness for an intended use).
5. Thirty-five states have accepted implied warranty by case law. See note 31 infra. For a
discussion of implied warranties, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969 & Supp. 1978).
6.
-Va-......,
247 S.E.2d 400 (1978).
7. English courts and common law jurisdictions in America ruled with consistency that
there were no implied warranties. They feared that such an introduction would inhibit vendors by leaving them uncertain both to the extent and duration of their liability to the
customer. Note, Yespen v. Burgess: Oregon Recognizes an Implied Warranty of Habitability
in the Sale of New Homes, 11 WILLAMmrTE L.J. 125, 126 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as
WILLAMrE].

8. Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200, 202 (1970). See WiLLAMmrrE,
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in the American common law.?
Lately, the doctrine of caveat emptor, with its long history of protecting
the seller at the expense of the buyer, has been on the decline in both
England and America." Due to the increasing interest in consumer protec-12
tion," most states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code [UCC].

Thus, states have replaced caveat emptor in the sales of personal property
with implied warranties of merchantability"s and fitness for a particular
purpose. "
supra note 7, at 126. For a thorough discussion of the origins and developments of caveat
emptor, see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YAIE, L.J. 1133 (1931).
9. Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200, 202 (1970). "The expression first
appeared in print in 1534, and the doctrine became firmly established in the common law
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." Comment, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Real
Property-Time for a Reappraisal, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 484 (1968), quoted in Comment,
Extension of Implied Warrantiesto Developer-Vendors of Completed New Homes, 11 URBAN
L. ANN. 257, 257 n.2 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as URBAN]. The doctrine of caveat emptor
was based upon the premise that a buyer and seller dealt at arm's length and that the
purchaser, who had an opportunity to inspect the subject matter of the stile, was on an equal
footing with the seller. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 11968).
10. See Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purchaseof a Defective Home, 49
J. URBAN L. 533, 549 (1971)[hereinafter cited as Bixby].
11. See WILLAME'rE, supra note 7, at 127.
12. Forty-nine states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
13. "Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind." U.C.C. § 2-314.
14. U.C.C. § 2-315, stating that:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Louisiana, a civil law state, was the only state which did not adopt the UCC. But Louisiana
did enact by statute an implied warranty extending both to real and personal property
transactions. The Louisiana statutes are as follows:
"Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect in the thing sold,
which renders it either absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it
must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice."
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (West, 1952);
"Apparent defects, that is, such as the buyer might have discovered by simple inspection,
are not among the number of redhibitory vices." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art 2521 (West, 1952);
"Whether the defect in the thing sold be such as to render it useless and altogether unsuited
for its purpose, or whether it be such as merely to diminish the value, the buyer may limit
his demand to the reduction of the price." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2541 (West, 1952);
"The action for a reduction of price is subject to the same rules and to the same limitation
as a redhibitory action." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2544 (West, 1952).
Only one other legislature, Maryland, has taken the initiative to abolish the use of caveat
emptor and enact an implied warranty in real estate transactions. See MD. [Real Propertyl
CODE ANN. § 10-203 (1974).
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The first indication that the courts would reconsider their historic position on the doctrine of caveat emptor in real estate sales occurred in 1931
with the English case of Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd.,' The court
reasoned that when a buyer purchases an uncompleted home, he has no
opportunity to inspect the finished product and must rely upon the builder
to complete the house in a workmanlike manner."6 Accordingly, the court
extended an implied warranty to the sale of an uncompleted home. The
Miller rule was accepted in the United States in 1957, in the Ohio case of
Vanderschrier v. Aaron. 7 Since that time, several other state courts have
followed the Vanderschrierdecision."
In 1964, Carpenterv. Donohoe9 carried the implied warranty theory a
step further. The Colorado Supreme Court held that an implied warranty
extended to a completed home.y The court determined that the difference
in rules between a house under construction and a completed house was
"incongruous" and "without a reasonable basis."'" Within several years,
other states recognized the need for home buyer protection.2 These jurisdictions aligned with Carpenter and held the builder-vendor liable for a
breach of implied warranty in new home sales.215. [1931] 2 K.B. 113. In this English case, the purchaser contracted with the buildervendor to buy a home which was in the course of construction when the contract was signed.
In a suit by the purchaser for structural defects, the court reasoned that while a person buying
a completed home can inspect for flaws before signing his contract, a purchaser of an unfinished home has no such opportunity. See URBAN, supra note 9, at 259.
16. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14
VANDrmmD L. Ray. 541, 544 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Bearman].
17. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957). In Vanderschrier, the purchasers sought
damages from the builder-vendor for faulty house construction. The house was not completed
at the time of sale and the court held that the defective construction of the sewer which
caused the basement to become flooded was a breach of the vendor's implied warranty that
the house would be habitable and completed in a workmanlike manner.
18. Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Loraso v. Custom Built
Homes, Inc., 144 So. 2d 459 (La. 1962); Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Hoye
v. Century Builders, 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
19. 154 Colo.78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). The plantiffs in Carpenter alleged breach of implied
warranty when the walls of the house they purchased began to crack. The court found a
breach of an implied warranty, even though the house was completed when the plaintiffs
bought it.
20. Id. at 402.
21. Id. See Bixby, supra note 10, at 556.
22. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Crawley v. Terhune, 437
S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d
803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash.
2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
23. Courts have held the builder-vendor liable for a particular defect. See, e.g., Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966)(water seepage in basement, which spread over
considerable portion of tiled floors); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App.
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Other courts have assaulted the doctrine of caveat emptor even more
extensively. In 1965, New Jersey, in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,,, not
only recognized the existence of implied warranties in real estate transactions, but also imposed strict liability upon the builder-vendor for personal
injuries resulting from his negligence.5 In addition, the court extended the
implied warranty beyond the original purchaser to cover the purchaser's
lessee.2"
California followed the liberal trend of the implied warranty doctrine in
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association.2 In Connor, the
court upheld an implied warranty claim against both the builder-vendor
and the lending institution which supplied the funds for the project. Another extension of the implied warranty theory appears in Illinois, in Schiro
v. W.E. Gould & Co.,2 where the buyer recovered for breach of an implied
warranty when the house was constructed in violation of the Chicago
Building Code. Finally, in Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc.,"
the South Dakota Supreme Court held that an implied warranty survived
delivery of the deed.
1969)(basement walls constructed without coating or sealing to withstand surface water pressure and no proper drainage facilities in basement); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83
S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967)(water seepage in basement after heavy rains); Humber v.
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)(fire caused by defective fireplace); House v. Thornton,
76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969)(basement walls, floors and foundation slipped and
cracked).
24. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). In Schipper, the infant plaintiff was scalded by a
defective hot water faucet. The court reasoned that the same public policy considerations
which led to abolition of caveat emptor in personalty sales were applicable to real property
transactions and held the builder-vendor, Levitt, liable for breach of an implied warranty.
25. Id. at 321.
26. Id. at 324. See Young and Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat Venditor?, 24
ARK. L. REv. 245, 269 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Young and Harper].
27. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). The court held that where the
success of the defendant association's transactions with construction companies depended on
ability to induce purchasers to finance purchase of a home with the defendant's funds,
defendant knew that persons in charge of construction companies were operating on thin
capitalization and the resultant risk of short cuts in construction, purchasers were generally
ill-equipped to discern defects, defendant had duty to exercise reasonable car& to prevent
defective home construction or sale and was liable to purchasers for damages.
28. 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960). The court held that the city code, requiring that
drainage and plumbing systems of each new building be separate and independent of any
other building, is incorporated into any contract to sell and purchase a building. Hence, a
violation of the city code constituted a breach of the implied warranty on the contract.
29. 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967). The plaintiffs were allowed to recover for
breach of an implied warranty when water seeped into their basement after a heavy rain. The
court relied upon the reasoning in product liability cases to conclude that there is no sound
reason for a distinction between the liability of person who erects a house and a manufacturer.
Id. at 806.
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From these developments, it appears that the trend throughout the nation is to eliminate the doctrine of caveat emptor in both personal and real
estate sales. Courts have long since recognized that buyers of goods in an
industrialized society must rely upon the skill and honesty of the supplier
to assure that purchases are of adequate quality.- Reasoning along the
same line, a majority of American jurisdictions have recently applied the
doctrine of implied warranty to the sale of new residences. 3'
III.

VIRGINIA REFUSES TO JOIN MAJORITY

A small minority of states still refuse to recognize an implied warranty
in realty transactions. 31 Virginia opted to remain with this minority on
August 31, 1978, with the decision in Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe..3 1 In
Bruce Farms, the Virginia Supreme Court held that an implied warranty
of fitness for the intended use did not apply to the sale of a new dwelling.
30. See Bixby, supra note 10, at 549.
31. Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt
Paving Co., 535 P.2d 1188 (Alaska 1975); Wewak v. Stewart, 274 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922
(1970); Pollard'v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648
(1974); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Vernali v. Centrella, 28
Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (1970); Smith v. Berwin Builders, Inc., 287 A.2d 693 (Del.
Super. 1972); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1972); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,
415 P.2d 698 (1966); Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App. 3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972); Theis v.
Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300 (1972); Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co., 212 Kan. 65, 510 P.2d
198 (1973); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969); Bermes v. Facell, 328 So.
2d 722 (La. 1976); McDonough v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 313 N.E.2d 435 (1974); Weeks v.
Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, affld., 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d
271 (1970); Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974); Smith v. Old Warson
Dev. Co., 479 S.W. 2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 214 N.W.2d 925
(1974); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971); Norton v. Burleaud, 115 N.H.
435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Centrella
v. Holland Constr. Corp., 82 Misc. 2d 537, 370 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1975); Hartley v. Ballou, 286
N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974); Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973); Jeanguneat
v. Jackie Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1978); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525
P.2d 1019 (1974); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Padula v. J.J. DebCin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175
S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner v. Middwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967);
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d
461 (1970); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969); Tavares v. Horstman,
542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). Accord, Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Shores v. Spann, 557 S.W.2d 67 (Tenn. 1977).
Cf. Tibbits v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967)("as is" clause prevents an
implied warranty). See also Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
32. Voight v. Ott, 87 Ariz. 128, 341 P.2d 923 (1959); Amos v. McDonald, 123 Ga. App. 509,
181 S.E.2d 515 (1971); Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968); Buchman
Plumbing Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 298 Minn. 328, 215 N.W.2d 479 (1974); Dittman
v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d 155, 168 N.W.2d 190 (1969).
33.
-..Va.-, 247 S.E.2d 400 (1978).
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Mr. and Mrs. Coupe, the plaintiffs, contracted to purchase a home constructed by defendant, Bruce Farms, Inc .3 The home was built, and the
plaintiffs moved in. The residence was one of several surfaced with a veneer of concrete bricks purchased by the defendant.* Shortly after taking
possession, plaintiffs discovered cracks in some of the bricks .31As a result,
they instituted suit against the defendant, alleging breach of an implied
warranty.
The trial court, sitting without a jury, ruled that "the builder-vendor of
a new completed building may be liable for breach of an implied warranty
of the fitness of the intended use of the building.' 3 On appeal, even after
carefully reviewing the recent trend to abolish caveat emptor," the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision,3 1 ' refusing to hold
that an implied warranty existed.
A.

Uniform Commercial Code Inapplicable?

The court first concluded that warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose, created by the UCC, were not applicable in this
case?' This is a valid conclusion since the UCC applies only to the sale of
goods,' and the Bruce Farms case involved the sale of a home.12 But this
fact should not have precluded the 3Virginia Court from analogizing that
an implied warranty was breached.
The UCC was enacted to afford protection to the consumer when his
34. Bruce Farms, Inc., was engaged in construction and sale of new homes in a residential
subdivision. Id. at 401.
35. The defendant purchased concrete bricks from Cavalier Concrete Products, Inc. Plaintiffs sued Cavalier but subsequently non-suited Cavalier, a bankrupt. id.
36. A total of 16,000 bricks were used in the construction of the CoupeE' home, and approximately fifty were cracked. Brief for Appellant at 16, Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453
(Va. August 31, 1978).
247 S.E.2d 400, 401 (1978).
37. Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, -Va.-.,
38. 247 S.E.2d at 402-03.
39. 247 S.E.2d at 404. The court also noted that this was a case of first impression in
Virginia. 247 S.E.2d at 403.
40. 247 S.E.2d at 402 n.1.
41. U.C.C. § 2-102 as codified in VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-102 (Added Vol. 1965).
42. By the law of accession, a home becomes a part of the realty. Yepsen v. Burgess, 269
Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1974). The Virginia Court reasoned that because there was no
statute on point, the common law rule is applicable. Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453
(Va. August 31, 1978) at 2.
43. Other courts have reasoned that the sale of goods, by analogy, should apply to the sale
of homes in reaching a decision in favor of implied warranties. See Wiawak v. Stewart, 274
Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965);
Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974). See also, Bixby, supra note 10, at 55051.
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inspection of mass-produced products was no longer an adequate source for
disclosing defects, which a merchant, who specialized in that product's
manufacture, had a better opportunity to discover.44 Today, the buildervendor is "nearly identical" to the merchant.4 The builder-vendof regularly deals in the construction and sale of new homes," and since most
defects in housing are latent,47 the experienced seller of a residence is in a
much better position to inspect the home and discover defects than is the
average buyer." Furthermore, the seller knows that the buyer is purchasing
a home for habitation49 and an accompanying warranty of fitness for habitation is simply fulfilling the expectation of both parties.",o
Another argument supporting analogy to the UCC is that many of
today's large homes in the popular subdivisions are built upon small lots.
The purchaser sees the sales transaction primarily as a purchase of a home
with the acquisition of the land as incidental. 5' To the buyer, the home
44. See Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantabilityand Fitness for Use: Recent Developments,

16

RUTGERS

L. REv. 493 (1962).

45. See Bixby, supra note 10, at 550. A merchant is defined as:
a person.who deals in goods of a kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself as having
such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1). See Pollatd v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115
Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
46. See Bixby, supra note 10, at 550.
47. Most cases which have come before the courts, have involved defects which were not
visible to the purchaser on inspection.
Included in such defects. . . might be a roof not properly installed, or one affording
poor and insufficient protection from the elements, or a foundation which gave way to
the weight of the structure . . . or the use of insufficient supporting timbers for an
upper floor. . . . The construction of a chimney with combustible material as a lining
or with improper openings also might be an example ...
Verali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200, 201 (1970). For specific case examples,
see note 23 supra. See also note 3 supra.
48. See Bixby, supra note 10, at 550. It is also too costly for a home buyer to pay a
professional inspector. See Bearman, supra note 16, at 545 n.15. Likewise, a "builder-vendor
is much more capable of distributing the cost of his mistakes than is the innocent home
buyer." Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 17 (Fla. 1972). Today, home buyers can join associations to protect themselves, such as the Home Owners Warranty Corp. (HOW). Nelson, Why
Builders Should Know HOW, 8 RaAL EsrATE REV. 46 (1978).
As a practical matter, the modem buyer of an American mass-produced development home
is just as vulnerable as the automobile purchaser. Brief for Appellees at 4, Bruce Farms, Inc.
v. Coupe, No. 770453 (Va. August 31, 1978). This vulnerability is the same situation which
brought about enactment Qf section 2-314 of the UCC. See Bixby, supra note 10, at 550-51.
49. This is similar to section 2-315 of the UCC. See Bixby, supra note 10, at 550-51.
50. See URBAN, supra note 9, at 258.
51. This is true even though the home becomes part of the realty by the law of accession.
Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1974).
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resembles personalty more than realty. In fact, it seems unreasonable that
all of the materials used in construction are covered by an implied warranty, but the finished product, the home, is not covered by the same
warranty. Since it appears that a house, constructed with goods, bears
more resemblance to personalty than to realty, a UCC analogy should be
52
valid.
The Virginia Court also refused to hold Mann v. Clowser,53 an earlier
Virginia case, applicable to Bruce Farms.5" In Mann, the court aligned
itself philosophically with the growing number of jurisdictions that had
recognized implied warranties. 5 The court held that it is implied in construction contracts that the building will be erected in a reasonably good
and workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for its intended purpose when completed." In contrast, Bruce Farms dealt with a contract for
a sale of a completed home. 7 The court stated that a contract to perform
a service, a building contract, necessarily implies a covenant to perform
according to prevailing standards, but a conveyance of real estate carries
no such covenant. 8
Certainly, when a person contracts for a sale of a new home, he expects
that the home has been constructed in a workmanlike manner and is fit
for habitation, just as if he had contracted with the builder directly for
construction of a home.59 Thus, the court's distinction between a building
contract and a sales contract is illogical. 0
B.

Scope of Implied Warranty
The court in Bruce Farms next addressed the problems involved in de-

52. Certainly it is a harsh result when "one who [buys] a chattel as; simple as a walking
stick or a kitchen mop [is] entitled to get his money back if the article [is] not of merchantable quality," Wawak v. Stewart, 274 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970), but a purchaser
of a $37,300.00 home [the purchase price of the Coupe's home in Bruce Farms, Brief for
Appellants at 4, Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453 (Va. August 31, 1978)], has no
remedy if the home proves not to be of merchantable quality.
53. 190 Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950). In Mann, a building constructed upon the Clowsers'
land by Mann was defective, the footings in the foundation being improperly constructed.
The court allowed recovery for the damages caused by the defective construction on the basis
of an implied warranty in the construction contract.
54. -. Va.-., 247 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1978).
55. Brief for appellees at 2, Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453 (Va. August 31, 1978).
56. Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950).
57. -__Va.-., 247 S.E.2d 400, 401 (1978).
58. Id. at 403.
59. Brief for Appellees at 2, Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453 (Va. August 31, 1978).
60. Several jurisdictions, which have invoked an implied warranty in new home sales, have
relied upon the Mann decision. See, e.g., Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d
200, 202 (1970); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
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fining the scope of an implied warranty.' First the court examined the
question of to whom the implied warranty should apply.62 Numerous jurisdictions hold that an implied warranty in the sale of a new home only
applies to the builder-vendor" of the home. 6' Since Bruce Farms, Inc., was
the builder-vendor of the plaintiff's home,6 5 the Virginia Court also could
have limited an implied warranty to the builder-vendor.
Secondly, the problem of confining an implied warranty puzzled the
court." The court questioned whether an implied warranty should be confined to the sale of new homes under construction and to those newly
constructed, or extended to the sale of renovated homes. These issues have
been settled by case law in other jurisdictions.6 7 Since the Coupes contracted for the sale of a newly completed home, the Virginia Supreme
Court could have followed Carpenterv. Donohoe6 which specifically extended an implied warranty to a completed home.
The court also raised the issue of whether an implied warranty theory
should be limited to a single-family detached dwelling or extended to
condominium units." Most cases which have reached the courts involved
single-family dwellings and courts applied an implied warranty. 70 Since
Bruce Farmsinvolved only a single-family dwelling, 7' the court easily could
61.
-Va.--., 247 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1978).
62. Id. at 403.
63. Builder-vendor has been defined as "one who buys land and builds homes upon the
land for purposes of sale to the general public." Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d
771, 774 n.10 (1972).
64. Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev.
Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo.
78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (19701; Tavares
v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). Cf. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d
698 (1966) (where builder used realtor to make sale); Weeks v. Salvick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich.
App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970)(where court said implied warranty could apply to any seller
of a new residence); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)(where vendor used
independent contractors for actual construction).
65. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453 (Va. August 31,
1978).
66. Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe,
Va.-., 247 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1978).
67. See, e.g., Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957)(court
found implied warranty in home under construction); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78,
388 P.2d 399 (1964) (court found implied warranty in completed home); and Worrell v. Barnes,
87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971)(court found implied warranty in renovated home).
68. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
69. Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe,
Va_..._, 247 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1978).
70. See note 31 supra.However, in Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 11 (Fla. 1972) the court held a
builder-vendor of condominiums liable for breach of an implied warranty.
71. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453 (Va. August 31,
1978).
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have sidestepped the condominium question by limiting its holding to the
facts of the case.
Lastly, the court questioned the extension of an implied warranty to
cover materials and fixtures used in new home construction.7 2 In Vernali
v. Centrella,7 3 the Connecticut Court decided that a warranty exists by
implication to the materials used in construction. In Hartley v. Ballou,7' a
North Carolina Court found that an implied warranty covered all fixtures
in a new home. 75 Once again, the Virginia Court's dilemma had been resolved previously elsewhere. As Connecticut did in 1970 and North Carolina did in 1974, the Court could have held a warranty applicabe to all
materials and fixtures used to construct the Coupes' home in Bruce
Farms. 7 Since all of these issues had been dealt with earlier, the Virginia
Supreme Court could have applied the case law of neighboring jurisdictions to reach a conclusion. This would not have been an unusual practice .71
The type and duration of the implied warranty were two major issues
faced by the court in Bruce Farms.7s The Virginia Supreme Court stated
that courts which have adopted the modem rule of implied warranty have
not invoked a uniform standard. 71 Jurisdictions have spoken in terms of an
implied warranty of habitability, 0 workmanlike manner,' reasonable
workmanship,8 2 workmanlike construction," and fitness for an intended
use."' However, in spite of the differences in terminology, each court has
72. Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, -Va.-.,
247 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1978).
73. 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (1970).
74. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
75. Other jurisdictions have allowed recovery for defects in various items. Gable v. Silver,
258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1972)(air conditioner); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207
A.2d 314 (1965)(boiler).
76. The defect in the Coupes home was the brick veneer, which could be considered a
construction material. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453
(Va. August 31, 1978).
77. See, e.g., Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 195 Va. 431, 78 S.E.2d 901 (1953)(where the
court held an architect to a reasonable standard of skill and care and relied upon Iowa and
Massachusetts law).
78. 247 S.E.2d at 403.
79. Id.
80. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Hana- an v. Dye, 4 Ill. App.
3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972).
81. Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51,
209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
82. Theis v. Heuer, 149 Ind. 52, 280 N.E.2d 300 (1972); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc.,
83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
83. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
84. House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
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held the builder-vendor liable for breach of an implied warranty for a
particular defect.
Virginia could have selected any one or a combination of standards and,
hence, the issue should not have posed even the slightest problem to the
court. Virginia already has established a definition of implied warranty in
construction contracts."6 A standard "co-extensive" with it would have
been the most logical choice." This type of implied warranty would be
termed a combination of good workmanship and fitness for an intended
use.M Certainly, such a standard would be in accord with other jurisdictions.8 9
The duration of an implied warranty is open to the court's discretion.
Some authorities have proposed a fixed statutory period, 0 but most courts
have applied a "reasonable" duration." "Reasonableness" is probably the
best solution to the problem, since an implied warranty, by its nature,
should be flexible to the needs of the plaintiffs in each case. 9 First, the
different geographical and climatic conditions within Virginia have various
inconsistent effects on new housing. Therefore, a fixed limitation would not
be a feasiblQ solution.93 Second, different parts of the construction have
different durational expectancies."4 In addition, some latent defects may
take years to surface, while others may become visible shortly after construction. 5 Greater protection for both the builder-vendor and the home
85. See note 31 supra. See also Comment, 53 N.C.L. REv. 1090, 1045 (1975).

86. Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950); Hall v. MacLeod, 191 Va. 665, 62
S.E.2d 42 (1950).

87. Brief for Appellees at 18, Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453 (Va. August 31, 1978).
88. Id. Such a standard would hold the builder-vendor liable for defects in construction

which a reasonable builder would not have made. Also it would hold a builder-vendor liable
if the home was not fit for habitation.
89. Other jurisdictions have used a combination of terms. See, e.g., Gable v. Silver, 258
So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1972); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Padula v. J.J.
Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Inc.,
83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
90. See Bearman, supra note 16, at 575-78 (proposes a one year duration); Haskell, The
Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Prop., 53 GEo. L.J. 633 (1965)(proposes a five year duration). See also MD. [Real Property]CODE ANN. § 10-204 (1974)(a one
year statutory limitation).
91. See, e.g., Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976) (en banc); Tavares v.
Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
92. See Comment, 10 TULSA L.J. 445, 448 (1975).

93. Id.
94. See Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975).
95. See 10 TULSA L.J. 44&, 448 (1975). See also, Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Inc., 83 S.D.
57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967)(took five years for the defect to become apparent); Humber v.
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)(defect immediately apparent).
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buyer would result from a case-by-case determination of the extent of
duration of a particular implied warranty. 6
Another concern addressed by the court was the proper measure of damages to be awarded upon breach of an implied warranty. 97 This has long
been a concern of the judicial system.9" Again, the most equitable solution
would appear to be a case-by-case determination, depending upon the
particular defect of the home.99 As stated in Mann,'10the proper measure
of damages depends ultimately upon what is required to place the plaintiffs in the position they would have occupied had the agreement been
honored.'9 '
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Virginia Supreme court has not followed the moderm trend. Instead,
the court decided in Bruce Farmsthat the common law doctrine of caveat
emptor is still a viable force in Virginia.9 2 However, conditions have radically changed since the origin of the general common law rule of caveat
emptor. 03 Since World War II houses have been mass-produced throughout
the United States. 4 The average buyer of a mass-produced home today is
96. Since Virginia has a five year statute of limitations on injuries to property, perhaps a
five year duration could be stipulated as an outside limitation. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01250 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
97. Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, No. 770453 (Va. August 31, 1978) at 6.
98. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1932).
99. Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975).
100. 190 Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950).
101. Two alternative solutions are available according to Mann. First, the reasonable cost
of construction and completion in accordance with the contract may be awarded. However,
if such cost is "grossly and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained," the court
might choose to award the difference between the value that the product contracted for would
have had and the value of the performance that was received. Id. at 86. See also, Hartley v.
Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776, 785 (1974)(where in dictum the court said that an action
would lie for recission, or for damages measured by the difference between the actual fair
market value and the fair market value as warranted.
102. "The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the
Bill of Rights and Constitution of this State, shall continue in full force within the same, and
be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly," VA. CODE ANN. § 1-10
(Repl" Vol. 1973). Interestingly, England has changed the common law of caveat emptor. See
A Conveyancer's Letter, 85 L.J. 219 (1939); Jennings v. Tavener, [19551 2 All. E.R. 769. See
note 42 supra.
103. See Bixby, note 10 supra.
104. See Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It,
52A CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967). In 1971, 656,000 homes were sold; 1972, 718,000; 1973,
620,000; 1974, 501,000; 1975, 544,000; 1976, 639,000; 1977 through March, 198,000. U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, CONSTRUCTION REPORTS (1977). In Virginia alone, the number of homes
authorized in 1970 were 39,986; 1971, 64,864; 1972, 78,437; 1973, 70,560; 1974, 45,062; 1975,
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not in a position, by skill or training, to discover latent defects.'05 As stated
in Humber v. Morton:06
[tihe caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism patently out of harmony with modem home buying practices. It does a disservice
not only to the ordinary prudent purchaser, but to the industry itself by
lending encouragement to the unscrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of shoddy work.'1
The sellers and buyers of realty today are not on an equal footing. Thus,
since the original rationale underlying caveat emptor is inapplicable,' 5 the
rule itself should be discarded.' 9
Perhaps the most important reason for the Virginia Court's decision not
to invoke an implied warranty was fear that, in so doing, they would be
legislating."10 Such a concern, however, did not inhibit courts in other
jurisdictions."' A Michigan Court concluded "the doctrine of caveat
emptor to be a common law court-imposed doctrine" and not that of the
legislature."' Further, an Arkansas Court stated that judicial modification
of a common law rule to achieve justice in light of modern economic and
technological advances is not legislating."3 Thus, it may be argued that the
court is the best governmental branch to change that which evolved under
common law.
Clearly, today, the seller is experienced and the average buyer is inexperienced in the field of real estate transactions. To apply the doctrine of
caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer making the largest purchase of
his lifetime,"' is a denial of justice."'5 Furthermore, it has been held that
35,028; 1976, 40,760; 1977, 63,564. Shernock and Serow, THE
SCHOOL OF BustNEss ADMINISTRATION REPORT (July,

COLGATE DARDEN GRADUATE

1978).

105. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966).
106. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
107. Id. at 562. See 2 JAEGER, WILLISTON ON COmNRAcrS § 926A (1963).
108. See note 9 supra.

109. Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1279 n.4 (Wyo. 1975).
Perhaps it is best summed up by Justice Holmes who stated, "[i]t
is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule persists from blind imitation of the past." 16 BAYLOR L. REv. 263, 277 (1964) (quoting
HOLMES, CoLLEcED LFGAL PAPERs, p. 187).
110. Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe,
Va.- 247 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1978).
111. Most jurisdictions have abolished caveat emptor, see note 31 supra. The argument
against judicial legislating was also used by the courts when they abolished caveat emptor in
personalty. See Wawak v. Stewart, 274 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970).
112. Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, 506 (1970).
113. Wawak v. Stewart, 274 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922, 925 (1970).
114. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966).
115. Id.
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the law should be based on the current concepts of what is right and just.
The common law is adept at keeping abreast of "changing needs and
mores" and "current requirements" in modem society.' 6 For instance,
Virginia did not hesitate to recognize the need for consumer protection in
personalty sales, and, as the trend indicates, the times warrant protection
for the buyer in new home sales.
The Virginia General Assembly's previous reluctance to legislate in this
area may forebode future procrastination.' In Thomas r. Cryer,"I a case
which is factually similar to Bruce Farms, the Maryland Court left the
decision of an implied warranty to its legislature. Apparently, Maryland's
General Assembly did not definitively resolve the issue until July 1, 1 9 7 6 ,n
- over seven years later. On March 15, 1977, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland in Krol v. York Terrace Building, Inc.,"' finally interpreted
the 1976 "housekeeping" amendment'2 as recognizing an implied warranty
of habitability in the sale of new homes.ln If nothing else, judicial estab116. See Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200, 203 (1970).
117. Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962); Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. v. Dunn, 181 Va. 390, 25 S.E.2d 254 (1943). As Justice Cardozo has noted: [a]
court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote
generation may, in the fullness of experience be found to serve another generation badly, and
which discards the old rule when if finds that another rule of law repreE.ents what should be
according to the established and settled judgment of society ....
B. CRDozo, THE NATURE
OF THE JuDIcIAL PROCESS 151 (1921)(quotedin Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 561-2 (Tex.
1968)).
118. See Wawak v. Stewart, 274 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922, 926 (1970).
119. 251 Md. 725, 248 A.2d 795 (1969) (per curiam) (exterior brickwork on plaintiffs new
home crumbled and peeled).
120. MD. CODE ANN. § 10-203(a)(Cum. Supp. 1976).
121. 35 Md. App. 321, 370 A.2d 589 (1977).
122. See note 120 supra and accompanying comments.
123. In Krol, supra note 121, at 594, the court stated:
[i]t is clear that the extended phrase beginning with "at the time" applies to all four
warranties set forth in § 10-203(a) and not, as the form of the revision might suggest,
only to the warrant of habitability.' When that is established, it is apparent that the
Legislature would hardly have intended these implied warranties, all of which were
expressly intended to apply to hidden and latent defects,6 to be applicable only "at
the time of the delivery of the deed .

. . ."

Such an interpretation would lead to an

absurd consequence and we are admonished whenever possible to avoid absurd statutory consequences.
Section 10-203 of The Maryland Code on its face appears to recognize implied warranties
in the sale of new homes. Analysis of case and statutory development, however, indicates a
slow and turbulent implementation of implied warranty protection in Maryland. Cf. Worthington Const. Corp. v. Moore, 266 Md. 19, 291 A.2d 466 (1972), Smith v. Millwood Const.
Corp. 260 Md. 319, 272 A.2d 19 (1971), and Thomas v. Cryer, supra note 119, with Krol v.
York Terrace Bldg., Inc., supra note 121. The cases infer a distinction between the case where
the purchaser contracts individually for construction of a home with the builder-vendor and
the case where the purchaser buys a home in a tract development.
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0

lishment of an implied warranty by Virginia's Supreme Court in Bruce
Farms would have brought the subject to the attention of the General
Assembly for such action as it deemed proper.
Deborah C. Welsh
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